Remington's (known) DEFECTIVE trigger system: Approx. 4 mill

Discussion in 'Firearms' started by Double Ott, Nov 20, 2009.

  1. Double Ott

    Double Ott Monkey+++

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    Someone else is going to be killed/murdered by this known trigger defect to Remington. Double Ott


    Defective Remington 700 Bolt-Action Rifle


    Remington’s Defective Trigger System
    A Historical Summary

    Extensive Claims and Litigation History

    1.Remington has been aware that its bolt-action rifles will sometimes fire absent a trigger pull.

    2.To date, Remington has received thousands of customer complaints of unintended discharge for the Model 700 and 710 alone. Over 100 injured individuals have sued Remington over the same defective design. Remington and its insurers have paid to settle most of the claims rather than admit the defect and pay the cost of a recall and refit thereby leaving millions of persons at risk of their lives and those of their family and friends. click on here to review Remington memo January 2, 1979 wherein Remington admits to its own defect and recognizes the danger to its customers)

    3.Ignoring thousands of customer complaints, Remington refused to recall its rifles, install a new trigger, or warn its customers of the potential danger. (click on here to review Remington memo dated January 2, 1979 wherein Remington admits to its own defect and recognizes the danger to its customers)

    4.Instead, Remington designed the new 710 (introduced in 2001) using the very same defective M700 fire control.

    5.Not surprisingly, Remington has already received numerous complaints from its customers of unintended discharge, mirroring the complaint history of the 700.

    The Defect

    1.Remington’s trigger mechanism uses an internal component called a “connector” – a design component not used by any other rifle manufacturer. The connector floats on top of the trigger body inside of the gun, but is not physically bound to the trigger in any way other than tension from a spring. When the trigger is pulled, the connecter is pushed forward by the trigger, allowing the sear to fall and fire the rifle.

    2.The proper position of the connector under the sear is an overlap of only 25/1000ths of an inch, but because the connector is not bound to the trigger, the connector separates from the trigger body when the rifle is fired and creates a gap between the two parts.

    3.Any dirt, debris or manufacturing scrap can then become lodged in the space created between the connector and the trigger, preventing the connector from returning to its original position.

    4.Remington’s defective fire control could have been redesigned to eliminate the harm or danger very inexpensively. There is no valid engineering reason why the successfully utilized connectorless designs could not have been used by Remington in its Model 700 and 710.

    5.In fact, Remington has recently done just that for the Model 700 with a newly designed trigger, the X-Mark Pro. That design, which eliminates the connector, was completed in 2002. However, Remington chose to continue with its prior unsafe design for financial reasons, never warning the public. Even today, Remington installs the new fire control into some but not all of its bolt-action rifles, leaving many users at risk with the old and defective design.

    Jury Verdicts and Appellate Court Opinions of Remington’s Defective Fire Control

    1.In Lewy v. Remington, 836 F.2d 1104, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 1988); the Eighth Circuit upheld a finding of punitive damages against Remington in 1985.

    2.In Campbell v. Remington Arms Co., 1992 WL 54928 (9th Cir. 1992)(unpublished opinion); affirmed a jury verdict of $724,000 based on a fire on bolt closure, finding no error.

    3.Later in 1992, the Texas Supreme Court, in Chapa v. Garcia, specifically describes Remington’s fire control as “defective.”

    4.In 1994, a Texas jury rendered a verdict in Collins v. Remington after Glenn Collins lost this foot to a Model 700 accidental discharge. The jury found that the fire control was defective and awarded a $15 million in exemplary damages. The total verdict was in excess of $17 million. (click on here to review Business Week article entitled “Remington Faces A Misfiring Squad”)

    5.The verdicts stopped with the Collins verdict. After that, Remington settled all claims. Instead of recalling or replacing the defective fire control, Remington has quietly paid almost $20 million to settle claims out of court, finally replacing the fire control only in 2007.
    Remington’s Redesign Efforts After the $17 million Collins Verdict

    1.After Collins, Remington again contemplated a recall and again recognized the need to redesign its fire control. Internal documents detail Remington’s extensive knowledge of the problem. However, until it finally introduced a new fire control in 2007 (a design that eliminates the connector), Remington consistently chose to forego a safer design.
    Timeline of Redesign Efforts

    1.In 1995, Remington openly acknowledges the need to “fix” the fire control and “eliminate” ‘Fire on Safety Release’ malfunction.”

    2.In 1997, when Remington embarked on the design of the Model 710, documents reflect Remington’s desire not to include the M700 “Walker” –based fire control in the M710.

    3.Remington designers then developed several connectorless fire controls for the M710. Remington documents clearly show that the new designs were favored (“The new concept barrel and fire control analysis was complete with excellent results.”)

    4.However, the designs met their downfall during Remington’s economic analysis. Project spending was put on hold in May 1998 “until economics and project is approved.” That approval never came. In August 1998, the safer designs were abandoned due to an “estimated cost increase.”

    5.Remington instead decided to pull the unsafe Model 700 fire control off the shelf and use it in the new Model 710 to “eliminate development cost and time.”

    6.As Remington began its internal testing of the new Model 710 (with the old Model 700 fire control installed), Remington, knowing the history of the design, warned its internal testers of the possibility of inadvertent discharge;
    For each of the four rounds in the magazine the tester will close the bolt “smartly” –(i.e. as quickly as practical” –and be prepared for the rifle to inadvertently follow down or fire.

    No such warning is provided to customers that purchase the Model 700 or 710, nor was such a warning given to the Barber parents, whose son died as the result of the trigger defect. (click on here to review excerpts from – CBS News 2001)

    1.In 2000, a Model 710 rifle fired on bolt closure during Remington’s testing. Remington’s own expert witness in litigation admits that Remington “could not nail down” the reason for the discharge without a trigger pull.

    2.In preparation for the introduction of the M710 to market, Remington Consumer Team Meeting minutes from 2001 reveal that Remington planned for personal injuries of its customers as a result of inadvertent discharges from Model 710 rifles:
    Safety/Injury Calls and the Model 710 – Ken – If a consumer calls with a safety concern, (i.e. FSR, fires when closed, personal injury or property damage, etc), these calls AND firearms go to Dennis or Fred

    1.Predictably, Remington began receiving reports of injury and accidental discharge from the Model 710 almost identical to the thousands of complaints it had received from the Model 700 soon after its release.

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