Continuing on with my study notes from “Analysis of Tactical Intelligence Experience in Southeast Asia,” we learn that intelligence in Vietnam did actually improve over time, once new platforms were deployed and commanders became more familiar with developing good intelligence requirements. One of the greatest sources of intelligence came via the South Vietnamese Human Intelligence (HUMINT) networks. HUMINT became more available when: The populace was protected. The populace became convinced that government security was there to stay. Relationships were developed among military, civilian, and police liaisons. Intelligence databases were full of reporting on local insurgent forces. Two of the lingering problems of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platforms were that they identified more targets (fixed sites) than could be actioned, and SIGINT often failed to determine the target site’s occupancy. The effectiveness of SIGINT early on was hampered due to mismanagement: direction finding (DF) information was forwarded only to upper echelons for analysis instead of being immediately relayed to tactical commanders who could action the targets. Another problem is that new intelligence gathering platforms coming into the theater lacked operational and technical support, such as maintenance, further making them poorly received by some tactical commanders. There were also some limiting factors to intelligence gathering, some of which were due to North Vietnamese countermeasures. Camouflage, for instance, and the dense jungle canopy limited the collection capacity of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Radio transmitters were remotely operated and located away from a headquarters, thereby masking the real location of potential high value target sites. Base areas and support facilities were sometimes duplicated as part of a deception plan, making targeting more difficult. Of all available methods, the most effective intelligence gathering came from: SIGINT Prisoner of War interrogations (HUMINT) Agent reports (HUMINT) Contacts developed by recon and forward air controllers (HUMINT) Airborne ADPS (People Sniffers), which could detect chemical compounds from fires and human sweat Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), which were used for intrusion detection. (Analyst Comment: A UGS doesn’t tell you what’s out there, only that something is moving nearby.) Although aerial photography (IMINT) was widely used, long delays in delivery and processing of film, and later interpretation, made more difficult by dense jungle canopy, made it less effective for tactical operations. Forward air controllers armed with cameras, on the other hand, were immensely effective for tactical commanders. Lessons Learned: If the populace fears retribution for their cooperation with you, they’re less likely to cooperate. If they don’t cooperate, then your information sources dry up. Relationships matter. Relationships facilitate the sharing of information, which may be critical to tactical operations. Build them carefully and strategically. Strike a balance between analysis and actionability. There’s a case to be made that raw but actionable information needs to be assessed for veracity and possibly analyzed before being acted upon. This is especially the case when the adversary is running deliberate deception campaigns. This is why skilled analysts matter: a commander needs to understand the results of this decision, re: the enemy situation, and the risks involved. Good analysts can provide that picture for him. Bad analysts can’t. Ensure commanders/decision-makers know the available means of intelligence gathering, and understand what platforms can and can’t provide. If tactical commanders in Vietnam understood sooner their organic intelligence capabilities, they may have made better use of them. There are LOTS of lessons learned in today’s post. These are my initial takeaways. Ensure you identify your own. Continue reading...
